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GRANTING AN AUTOMATIC 
AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY 
RESPONSE: PROTECTING NATIONAL 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM 
CYBERATTACK 
INTRODUCTION 
he Internet enables people to easily communicate across 
the world and freely share files, photos, and videos with-
out geographical limitation. It has undoubtedly become essen-
tial to all modern countries in the world; it is at the cornerstone 
of and controls commerce, government activities, energy pro-
duction and distribution, water treatment, mass transit, and 
emergency services. 1  However, the Internet’s connectedness 
and openness have also allowed anyone to anonymously launch 
cyberattacks and inflict damage upon another country without 
physical limitation.2 From hundreds of miles away and using 
only a laptop computer,3 states and non-state actors4 alike can 
attack another nation’s critical infrastructure5—including sys-
																																																																																																																												
 1. See ANDRE COLARIK, CYBER TERRORISM: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS vii–xii (2006). 
 2. See THOMAS WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT, NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 21–22 (2000). 
 3. See Lieutenant Commander Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma 
of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active De-
fenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2009). 
 4. In this Note, unless specified otherwise, “state” refers to a nation. A 
non-state actor refers to an individual or an entity that is not affiliated or 
under the control of a nation’s government. 
 5. Critical infrastructure are those “systems and assets, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, na-
tional economic security, [and] national public health or safety.” 42 U.S.C. § 
5195c(e); Major Sean Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical 
Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 404, 406 (2007) (“Critical 
infrastructure includes the following sectors: agriculture, food, water, public 
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information 
and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chem-
ical industry and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping.”); National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 29–30 
(2002), available at http://www.ncs.gov/library/policy_docs/nat_strat_hls.pdf 
[hereinafter National Strategy]. 
T
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tems that are vital to national security such as sectors control-
ling energy, transportation, food, public health, and chemical 
industry 6 —instantaneously causing disastrous effect to the 
targeted nation and its citizens.7 
In recent years, several episodes have scratched at the sur-
face of such disastrous possibilities. In 2007, the Russian gov-
ernment allegedly launched a series of cyberattacks8 on Esto-
nia, which essentially paralyzed the entire country; the attacks 
affected Estonia’s commercial banks, media outlets, and gov-
ernment websites.9 In 2009, Georgia also came under cyberat-
tack, resulting in the shutdown of Georgia’s government and 
commercial websites.10 Just a year later, in 2010, a sophisticat-
ed virus known as Stuxnet infiltrated and significantly im-
paired an Iranian uranium enrichment plant by sabotaging the 
plant’s centrifuges.11 Stuxnet had the capacity to attack com-
puter networks that controlled “oil pipelines, electronic utili-
ties, nuclear facilities, and other industrial sites.”12 The most 
significant, and alarming, aspect of the Stuxnet episode is that 
the initial attacker spread the virus information across the 
world, and its secrets are now available to anyone who seeks 
																																																																																																																												
 6. See Condron, supra note 5, at 406; National Strategy, supra note 5 at 
29–30. 
 7. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 18–20. 
 8. In this Note, “cyberattack” refers to “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy 
computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them.” 
Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future 
of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011). 
 9. See Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data 
Siege in Estonia, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?scp=1&sq=est
onia,%20russians&st=Search; see also Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the 
Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2007), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-
09/ff_estonia?currentPage=5. 
 10. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: 
An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F. 
L. REV. 43, 46 (2009). 
 11. David E. Sanger, Iran Fights Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26iran.html?scp=8&sq
=stuxnet&st=cse [hereinafter Iran Fights Malware]. 
 12. Id. 
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them. As a result, anyone can download Stuxnet, redesign the 
code, and launch it to against a new target.13 
The United States is especially vulnerable to cyberattack, 
partly due to the fact that its information and electronic net-
works of military, public, and private sectors are interconnect-
ed.14 Moreover, some of the United States’ adversaries already 
possess the ability to directly attack one of the United States’ 
critical infrastructure sectors via cyberattack, and America 
may not be prepared for such attack.15 On May 12, 2011, two 
years after President Obama released Cyberspace Policy Re-
view, a comprehensive review of the federal government’s ef-
forts and strategy in protecting the nation’s information and 
communication infrastructure, 16  the Obama Administration 
unveiled a Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal, a non-binding 
set of regulations the Obama Administration composed in order 
to improve the security of the nation’s network and infrastruc-
ture,17 and submitted it to Capitol Hill.18 One of the purposes of 
																																																																																																																												
 13. John Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, N.Y. Times (Sept. 
26, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html?scp=5&sq=stux
net&st=cse [hereinafter A Silent Attack]. 
 14. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBER K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT 
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 226–27 (2010). 
 15. 60 Minutes: Former Chief of National Intelligence Says U.S. Unpre-
pared for Cyber Attack (CBS television broadcast Nov. 8, 2009) (Transcript 
available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/06/60minutes/main5555565.shtml) 
(In a 2009 interview with 60 Minutes, Admiral Mike McConnell, former Di-
rector of National Intelligence, opined that the United States’ adversaries 
have the capability to bring down a power grid via cyberattack, and stated 
that “[the] United States is not prepared for such an attack.”). 
 16. White House, Cyberpolicy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient 
Information and Communications Infrastructure, (May 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_fina
l.pdf (“But with the broad reach of a loose and lightly regulated digital infra-
structure, great risks threaten nations, private enterprises, and individual 
rights. The government has a responsibility to address these strategic vul-
nerabilities to ensure that the United States and its citizens, together with 
the larger community of nations, can realize the full potential of the infor-
mation technology revolution.”). 
 17. Cybersecurity Proposal, WHITE HOUSE, (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/law-
enforcement-provisions-related-to-computer-security-full-bill.pdf [hereinafter 
Cybersecurity Proposal]. 
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the Proposal was to “protect our national security by address-
ing threats to our power grids, water systems, and other criti-
cal infrastructure.”19 
In order to address the growing threat of cyberattacks, there 
have been efforts to create international agreements to regu-
late cyberspace, to analogize the issue of cyberattacks to cur-
rent international law, and even to ban cyber weapons.20 How-
ever, these efforts have not been successful and are not ade-
quate to address the danger of cyberattacks on national critical 
infrastructure.21 Scholars argue that any international treaty 
regarding cyberspace will be insufficient and nearly impossible 
to enforce,22 and it is unclear whether the current international 
legal regime can govern cyberattacks.23 Making matters more 
difficult, and the current international efforts even less ade-
quate, is the attribution problem;24 due to the anonymity aspect 
																																																																																																																												
 18. Howard A. Schmidt, The Administration Unveils Its Cybersecurity Leg-
islative Proposal, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/12/administration-unveils-its-
cybersecurity-legislative-proposal. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185, 2296 
U.N.T.S. 123 (In 2001, the Council of Europe drafted and adopted Convention 
on Cybercrime, the first international treaty seeking to address crimes in 
cyberspace) [hereinafter Convention on Cybercrime]; see also Todd Leaven & 
Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command: International Re-
strictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 15–22 (2010) (de-
scribing the debate over establishment of international agreement regarding 
cyberattacks); see also Waxman, supra note 8, at 426 (examining the chal-
lenge of addressing cyberattacks by using Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United 
Nations Charter). 
 21. See Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
373, 391 (2011); see also Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 19–20; Scott J. 
Shackelford, Article: From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber At-
tacks in International Law, 27 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 192, 216–18 (2009); 
 22. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 23–24; see also Hollis, supra 
note 21, at 392–93. 
 23. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 427 (stating that Charter Article 2(4)’s 
prohibition of use of force is difficult to interpret); see also Hollis, supra note 
21, at 393 (“First, states must not launch (or threaten) a cyberattack that 
qualifies as a use of force . . . . This prohibition is vague in its particulars.”). 
 24. Attribution refers to the ability to trace back to the original machine, 
actor, or entity that initiated the cyberattack. David D. Clark & Susan Lan-
dau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 531, 531–32 (2011). 
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of the basic architectural structure of the Internet, it is difficult 
to pinpoint the original initiator of a cyberattack.25 
Although international treaties regulating cyberspace may be 
ineffective, to most effectively protect national critical infra-
structure against cyberattacks, an international agreement is 
needed that will authorize a nation that has been cyberat-
tacked to respond with military action. Part I of this Note pro-
vides a background to explain the immediacy and the potential 
disastrous effect of a cyberattack to a country’s critical infra-
structure. Part II discusses the attribution problem of cyber-
space and its effect on regulation of cyberattacks. Part III ex-
plains possible response measures under the current interna-
tional law, argues the inadequacy of current international law, 
and explores the difficulty of establishing a future, hypothetical 
international legal regime regarding cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure. Finally, Part IV proposes an international 
agreement that will grant automatic authority for a nation to 
respond with a military action against a state 26  that has 
launched a cyberattack upon the nation’s critical infrastruc-
ture, and explains how the proposed agreement will also mini-
mize the attribution problem. Furthermore, Part IV elucidates 
the need for such agreement, its effectiveness, and nations’ in-
centives to join the proposed international agreement. 
I. BACKGROUND: IMMEDIACY AND THE POTENTIALLY 
DISASTROUS EFFECTS OF A CYBERATTACK ON NATIONAL 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. Types, Purposes, and Impacts of a Cyberattack 
A foreign state or a non-state actor can use different types of 
cyberattacks against another nation to achieve different pur-
poses. There are largely three categories of cyberattacks: In-
ternet-delivered malicious software,27 denial-of-service (“DOS”) 
																																																																																																																												
 25. For a detailed explanation, see id. at 542–44; see also Hollis, supra note 
21, at 397–98. 
 26. The proposed international agreement will grant an injured state au-
thority to respond with military action against any state that has launched a 
cyberattack on its critical infrastructure, or against a state from which a non-
state entity has launched a cyberattack, regardless of whether the govern-
ment authorized the attack. 
 27. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 13–14. For further information, see Major 
John S. Fredland, Building a Better Cybersecurity Act: Empowering the Exec-
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attacks,28 and “unauthorized remote intrusion into computer 
systems by individuals.” 29  The Internet-delivered malicious 
software, more commonly known as “malware,” affects comput-
er systems by infecting e-mails, exploiting vulnerable engines, 
and visiting infected websites.30  The denial-of-service attack 
targets a computer system, and overwhelms it with infor-
mation until it seizes and can no longer function.31 The most 
severe form of DOS attack is a distributed-denial-of-service 
(“DDoS”) attack because, in addition to shutting down comput-
er systems, it can make the system more vulnerable to other 
forms of attacks by affecting the system’s defenses.32 The indi-
vidual remote intrusion involves unauthorized access to a com-
puter system by an attack,33  which enables the attacker to 
harm the system in any number of ways.34 
A state or a non-state actor can use these different types of 
cyberattacks to perform a variety of tasks: from stealing some-
one’s identity to illegally extracting classified data.35 A cyberat-
tack that extracts confidential information can result in loss of 
millions of dollars. For example, in 2007, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation estimated that cyberattacks caused an average 
financial loss of $167,713 per attack and “over $400 billion in 
damages in the United States.”36 Not long after, during a 2009 
speech, President Obama stated that in 2008 alone cyber crim-
inals stole intellectual property worth up to one trillion dollars 
from businesses around the world.37 More recently, in 2010, 
Google, and more than thirty other U.S. companies, suffered 
																																																																																																																												
utive Branch Against Cybersecurity Emergencies, 206 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10–13 
(2010). 
 28. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 13–14; see also Fredland, supra note 27, at 10. 
 29. Id. 
 30. RICK LEHTINEN ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 3–21 (2d ed. 2006). 
 31. Id. at 81. 
 32. COLARIK, supra note 1, at 103. 
 33. Id. at 94. 
 34. See id. at 84. 
 35. See Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 536–42. 
 36. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 18 n.95 (citing CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: 
VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 27–29 (2008)). 
 37. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by 
the President on Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure (May 29, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-
by-the-president-on-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure). 
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cyberattacks that illegally downloaded intellectual property 
data from the companies’ computer networks.38 
In addition to attacking individuals or private companies, 
cyberattack’s severity can elevate to the matter of national se-
curity. A cyberattack can “pry into a state’s public, sensitive 
and classified computers . . . to manipulate data; to deceive de-
cision makers; to influence public opinion; and even to cause 
physical destruction from remote locations abroad.”39 As noted 
above, Georgia and Estonia experienced firsthand the effect 
that a cyberattack can have on their national security, and the 
United States has also suffered national security breaches from 
cyberattacks. For instance, in 2008, there was a breach in the 
U.S. military computer network when an unknown person in-
serted a flash drive to a military laptop; the malware inside the 
flash drive stole a great amount of classified information.40 On 
July 4, 2009, a DDoS attack affected a number of U.S. and 
South Korean government websites.41 Specifically, the attacks 
shut down the U.S. Secret Service website, including its Treas-
ury and Transportation Departments pages,42 and South Ko-
rea’s Blue House,43 Defense Ministry, and National Assembly 
websites. 44  Cyberattacks such as these, attempting to steal 
classified national security information and to shut down gov-
ernment websites, still continue and are not likely to stop any-
time soon.45 
																																																																																																																												
 38. John Markoff et al., In Digital Combat, U.S. Finds No Easy Deterrent, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/world/26cyber.html?scp=1&sq=in%20digi
tal%20combat,%20u.s.%20finds%20no%20easy%20deterrent&st=cse. 
 39. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 17–18 (quoting WINGFIELD, supra note 2, at 
21–22). 
 40. Waxman, supra note 8, at 444. 
 41. Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Cyberattacks Jam Government and 
Commercial Websites in U.S. and South Korea, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/technology/09cyber.html?scp=1&sq=cybe
rattacks%20jam&st=cse. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Blue House is South Korea’s equivalent of the White House. 
 44. Sang-Hun & Markoff, supra note 41. 
 45. General Keith Alexander, the Director of National Security Agency, 
stated that, in 2010 the Department of Defense alone was subject to “hun-
dreds and thousands” of cyberattack attempts everyday. Steven G. Bradbury, 
The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Opera-
tions, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 591, 592 (2011). 
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B. Potential Impact of a Cyberattack on National Critical Infra-
structure 
Although cyberattacks can have a variety of negative impacts 
on national security, scholars believe that the most dangerous 
attacks are those against a nation’s critical infrastructure.46 A 
direct cyberattack to a nation’s critical infrastructure will “like-
ly result in significant loss of life, as well as economic and so-
cial degradation.”47  Citizens’ confidence in their government 
will decline dramatically, and the rise in the level of fear 
among citizens will “impact the basic social fabric.”48 According 
to Richard Clarke, the former Chair of the President’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board, a successful cyberattack on 
vulnerabilities in the U.S. critical infrastructure will likely be 
disastrous: “Transportation systems could grind to halt. Elec-
tronic power and natural gas system[s] could malfunction. 
Manufacturing could freeze. 911 Emergency call centers could 
jam. Stock, bond, futures, and banking transactions could be 
jumbled . . . our forces [will be] at great risk by having their 
logistics system fail.”49 As Clarke has eluded, the days when a 
cyberattack could result in the mere theft of documents seem to 
be over. 
C. Emergence of Stuxnet and Future Cyberattack on Critical 
Infrastructure 
The danger of a cyberattack on national critical infrastruc-
ture increases as the complexity and sophistication of cyberat-
tacks advance. Cybersecurity experts and analysts widely be-
																																																																																																																												
 46. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 18 n.95; see Timothy Shimeall et al., Counter-
ing Cyber War, 49 NATO REV. 16, 17–18 (Winter 2001/2002), available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/0104-en.pdf; see also, Rebecca C. E. 
McFadyen, Protecting the Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure: Is the Department of 
Homeland Security Our Nation’s Savior or the Albatross Around Our Neck?, 5 
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 319, 342 (2009). 
 47. Shimeall, supra note 46, at 17. 
 48. Id. at 18 (describing the likely results of a cyberattack on different pil-
lars of a nation’s critical infrastructure). 
 49. Cyber Security: The Challenges Facing Our Nation in Critical Infra-
structure Protection: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Inter-
governmental Relations and the Census of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform H.R., 
108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Richard Clark, Special Advisor, United 
States National Security Council). 
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lieve that Stuxnet50 was responsible for destroying one-fifth of 
Iran’s nuclear centrifuges in 2010.51 When Stuxnet first sur-
faced in 2009, experts described it as “the most sophisticated 
cyberweapon ever developed.”52 The Stuxnet malware that at-
tacked the Iranian nuclear facilities appears to have included 
two major components: the first component was designed to 
spin Iran’s nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control, and the 
second component “secretly recorded what normal operations 
at the nuclear plant looked like, then played those readings 
back to plant operators, like a pre-recorded security tape in a 
bank heist, so that it would appear that everything was operat-
ing normally while the centrifuges were actually tearing them-
selves apart.”53 The program was successful, and the engineers 
and officials of the Iranian nuclear facilities did not notice that 
Stuxnet was sabotaging their nuclear facilities.54 
What separates Stuxnet from previous viruses and malwares 
used for cyberattack is that it had the ability to “jump from 
																																																																																																																												
 50. Cybersecurity experts widely believe that Israel and the United States 
were behind the development, testing, and eventual launch of Stuxnet in or-
der to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program development. See Iran Fights Malware, 
supra note 11; see also Times Topics: Stuxnet, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malw
are/stuxnet/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier [hereinafter Stuxnet]. But see 
John Markoff, A Code of Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/weekinreview/03markoff.html?scp=6&sq
=stuxnet&st=cse (noting that it is unlikely that Israeli and U.S. governments 
left such blatant clues, and the real authorship of Stuxnet is not likely to be 
discovered) [hereinafter A Code of Chaos]. However, according to an article in 
the New York Times in June 2012, Stuxnet was developed by the United 
States and Israel to “slow the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts. David E. 
Sanger, Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-
of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?hp [hereinafter Cyberattacks Against Iran]. 
 51. Times Topics: Iran’s Nuclear Program (Nuclear Talks 2012), N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2012), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/
nuclear_program/index.html?scp=3&sq=stuxnet,%20iran&st=cse [hereinafter 
Iran’s Nuclear Program]. 
 52. William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on 
Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagew
anted=all. 
 53. Stuxnet, supra note 50. 
 54. Id. 
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Windows-based computers to a specialized system used for con-
trolling industrial equipment, like electric power grids, manu-
facturing plants, gas pipelines, dams and power plants.”55 Pre-
viously, and in contrast, most types of cyberattacks focused on 
extracting privileged information from websites and corporate 
or military networks.56 Whoever created Stuxnet intended the 
virus to go after industrial systems and specifically attack a 
country’s critical infrastructure.57 
Though the Iranian episode has passed, Stuxnet is still capa-
ble of wreaking havoc. Although Stuxnet is a technological 
wonder and a proof of advancement in computer technology, it 
is a weapon that poses significant danger to many nations’ crit-
ical infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the most frightening 
part of Stuxnet is that the creator of Stuxnet spread the mal-
ware throughout the world.58 The Stuxnet code has appeared in 
many countries, including China, India, Indonesia, and Iran,59 
and it continues to spread at an alarming rate.60 Melissa Hath-
away, a former U.S. National Cybersecurity Coordinator, stat-
ed that “[p]roliferation is a real problem, and no country is pre-
pared to deal with it.”61 Another problem with Stuxnet is that it 
is “highly visible,” meaning any government or cybersecurity 
companies can dissect and examine the Stuxnet code.62 This is 
dangerous because there is always a possibility of an attacker 
creating different versions Stuxnet and launching new as-
saults. 63  In fact, in October 2011, a new Stuxnet-like virus 
																																																																																																																												
 55. A Code of Chaos, supra note 50. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See A Silent Attack, supra note 13; see also William J. Broad & David 
E. Sanger, Worm Was Perfect for Sabotaging Centrifuges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
18, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/middleeast/19stuxnet.html?pagew
anted=all (In the case of Iranian nuclear facilities, experts determined that 
Stuxnet “had been precisely calibrated in a way that would send nuclear cen-
trifuges wildly out of control.”). 
 58. A Silent Attack, supra note 13 (exploring different theories on the rea-
son behind the widespread of Stuxnet). It seems that an element of the Stux-
net program was released accidentally. See Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra 
note 50. 
 59. A Code of Chaos, supra note 50. 
 60. A Silent Attack, supra note 13. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Stuxnet, supra note 50. 
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called “Duqu” emerged, equally capable of threatening the se-
curity of a country’s critical infrastructure.64 
Creating a virus or program that is as advanced and complex 
as Stuxnet is not easy or cheap. Some have speculated that the 
cost of creating Stuxnet was approximately $1 million and that 
the virus was “sophisticated enough to have required backing 
of one or more nation states.”65 In fact, an article from the New 
York Times highlighted the difficulty that the United States 
had in developing what later became known as Stuxnet until 
there was a breakthrough aided by the Israeli government.66 
This demonstrates that it is unlikely that non-state entities, 
individuals, or less developed countries with limited technology 
and resources have the ability to create a type of cyberattack 
that is equally or more sophisticated and destructive than 
Stuxnet. 
Due to the emergence of Stuxnet, the world is now aware of a 
type of cyberattack that can directly target a nation’s critical 
infrastructure and bring about devastating effect. If there is a 
successful cyberattack on a country’s oil pipelines, nuclear 
plants, stock market, or water plants, it can have a devastating 
effect on the country’s entire population. Thus, it is imperative 
that the international community quickly creates a method to 
effectively address and prevent such a cyberattack on national 
critical infrastructure. 
II. THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM 
The attribution problem is the source of much of the chal-
lenges of regulating cyberspace.67 Simply put, cyberspace pro-
vides a platform where one can engage in activity anonymous-
ly.68 Anonymity can create problems even at the most basic lev-
																																																																																																																												
 64. John Markoff, New Malicious Program by Creators of Stuxnet Is Sus-
pected, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/technology/stuxnet-computer-worms-
creators-may-be-active-again.html [hereinafter New Stuxnet]. 
 65. Ben Flanagan, Former CIA Chief Speaks out on Iran Stuxnet Attack, 
NAT’L (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-
insights/technology/former-cia-chief-speaks-out-on-iran-stuxnet-attack (not-
ing that it cost approximately $1 million to create the Stuxnet virus). 
 66. See Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 50. 
 67. For an in-depth discussion of attribution issues, see Clark & Landau, 
supra note 24, at 531. 
 68. Hollis, supra note 21, at 397. 
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el of the Internet use. For example, the anonymous aspect of 
the Internet has enabled schoolchildren to engage in cyberbul-
lying, a label for online activities of teasing, harassing, or abus-
ing others.69 When dealing with normal Internet uses, govern-
ment agencies and police can often track down the person who 
posted such comments through an Internet Protocol (“IP”) ad-
dress with the assistance of an Internet Service Provider.70 
However, IP address tracing has many flaws.71 An IP address 
may be a corporate account that actually holds numerous in-
ternal accounts or may lead to a physical location that provides 
free access to the general public, such as a coffee shop.72 Even 
when an IP address leads to the original machine that initiated 
a cyberattack, it may be a computer corrupted with a virus. Us-
ing a virus in this way, an attacker can launch a cyberattack 
remotely from the corrupted computer, thereby concealing his 
actual identity.73 In fact, many computers in the United States 
are infected with viruses without the knowledge of the owners 
or users, and an attacker can use these computers to remotely 
launch attacks on other computers or networks.74 Additionally, 
a skilled hacker can leave “false flag,” making an innocent enti-
ty seem responsible for a cyberattack.75 
Even if some attacks are traceable, it takes much effort, ex-
pertise, and expense to track them. 76  When a government 
agency or a security firm is successful in determining the origi-
																																																																																																																												
 69. See Times Topics: Cyberbullying, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/cyberbullying/in
dex.html?scp=1&sq=cyber%20bullying&st=cse (“Its amorphous nature and 
the rapidly changing technological landscape have made it difficult for 
schools and even the courts to address the cyberbullying.”). 
 70. Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 545. If the Internet Service Provid-
er (“ISP”) keeps a good record of IP addresses that it assigns, then it can 
trace which computer had an IP address that it assigned. However, since 
ISPs regularly clear their IP address logs, a request to track the source must 
happen quickly. Hollis, supra note 21, at 398–99. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 378. 
 74. Fredland, supra note 27, at 11 (citing Jack Goldsmith, Can We Stop the 
Global Cyber Arms Race?, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/31/AR2010013101834.html); Hollis, supra note 
22, at 378. 
 75. Hollis, supra note 21, at 397. 
 76. See id. at 398–400; Condron, supra note 5, at 418. 
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nal machine that initiated the attack, it still must identify the 
person who launched it.77 Yet even if the computer user whose 
activity sparked the cyberattack can be identified, the question 
of who was actually behind the attack remains.78 An individual, 
terrorist group, or even a nation state, could have launched the 
cyberattack; 79  merely identifying the individual person who 
used the machine that initiated the attack may not necessarily 
unveil the actual entity behind the cyberattack.80 Pinpointing 
the actual entity that originated the cyberattack is important 
because the responsive action that a government can take will 
differ based the nature of that identity.81 
It is virtually impossible to track down the original entity be-
hind a sophisticated cyberattack.82 Cybersecurity experts claim 
that they will never know who was behind the creation of 
Stuxnet and its launch on the Iranian nuclear facility.83 This 
poses a problem in regulating cyberspace because without a 
system that can catch and prosecute the perpetrator, it will be 
difficult to deter cyberattack attempts.84 Effective deterrence 
comes from catching the perpetrator and rendering an appro-
priate punishment,85 but if one can remain anonymous and un-
traceable throughout a cyberattack, then there is no reason for 
that entity to stop launching cyberattacks.86 Thus, the attribu-
tion problem becomes the main issue of any international 
agreement attempt to regulate cyberattacks. Unless the basic 
																																																																																																																												
 77. See Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 542–43, 547. 
 78. Condron, supra note 5, at 417. 
 79. Id. at 404; Shackelford, supra note 21, at 199–200. 
 80. See Toby L. Friesen, Resolving Tomorrow’s Conflicts Today: How New 
Developments Within the U.N. Security Council Can Be Used to Combat 
Cyberwarfare, 58 NAVAL L. REV. 89, 105 (2009); see also Hollis, supra note 21, 
at 399–400. 
 81. Friesen, supra note 80, at 103. 
 82. Hollis, supra note 21, at 378. 
 83. A Code of Chaos, supra note 50. 
 84. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 25. 
 85. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 8–9. 
 86. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 17 (“As one might expect, current 
international agreements that might be translated to cyber-warfare are pre-
sumed to concern relations among different nations, instead of individual 
actors. Uncertainty still remains, therefore, in how the same law can be 
translated to individuals, acting independently from any government, who 
may engage in cyber-warfare.”). 
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structure and architecture of the Internet changes,87 it will be 
impossible to accurately trace back to the original entity every 
time. However, thorough and stringent enforcement of criminal 
law can minimize the attribution problem,88 and Part IV of this 
Note will explain how the international agreement to use mili-
tary force can compel countries to exercise their domestic law 
enforcement to deter cyberattacks. 
III. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE CURRENT AND FUTURE 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN ADDRESSING CYBERATTACKS 
ON NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. Current International Treaty 
The development in capabilities and sophistication of 
cyberattacks led to a widespread call for an international trea-
ty expanding to cyberattacks the current application of the law 
of war.89 However, preexisting international treaties are inade-
quate to address and deter cyberattacks on a nation’s critical 
infrastructure. The European Convention on Cybercrime treats 
cyberattacks as only a criminal matter, rather than as a na-
tional security matter. Also, the current bodies of international 
law, such as the Geneva Convention and the United Nations 
Charter, primarily govern relations among nation states and 
not non-state actors. Moreover, it is ambiguous whether the 
issue of cyberattacks can fit into the legal regime of the current 
international law. 
1. The Convention on Cybercrime 
In 2001, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on 
Cybercrime, the first international treaty addressing cyberat-
																																																																																																																												
 87. Although some scholars argue for the change in the very architecture 
of the Internet, most scholars believe that such a change will not solve the 
attribution problem. See Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 533 (“Redesign-
ing the Internet so that all actions can be robustly attributed to a person 
would not help to deter the sophisticated attacks we are seeing today. At the 
same time, such a change would raise numerous issues with respect to priva-
cy, freedom of expression, and freedom of action . . . .”). 
 88. See COLARIK, supra note 1, at 39; see also Christopher E. Lentz, A 
State’s Duty to Prevent and Respond to Cyberterrorist Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
799, 820–22 (2010). 
 89. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 15. 
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tacks.90 The Convention “requires parties to adjust their do-
mestic criminal law to proscribe certain commonly defined of-
fenses such as illegal access and data interference.”91 It also 
requires member states to cooperate in investigating cyber-
crimes, to disclose digital evidence, and to prosecute cybercrim-
inals.92 Currently, this is the only cyber-specific treaty, and so 
far twenty-nine European states and the United States have 
joined the Convention on Cybercrime.93 
Although the Convention on Cybercrime tries to promote co-
operation among member states to prosecute and deter cyber-
criminals, it has numerous flaws. First of all, it does not in-
volve many key nations that are often at the center of cyberat-
tack incidents and not even all of the European nations have 
ratified it.94 Outside of the twenty-nine European states, the 
United States is the only non-European nation to join the trea-
ty.95 Second, the Convention on Cybercrime, as the title of the 
treaty suggests, specifically focuses on criminal laws and crim-
inal prosecution of cyberattackers.96 The purpose of the Con-
vention is to effectively fight against cybercrime by “requir[ing] 
increased, rapid and well-functioning international co-
operation in criminal matters.”97 The Convention does not men-
tion any situations involving cyberattacks initiated by a mem-
ber state’s government or military. This poses a problem be-
cause if a cyberattack comes from a government agency or mili-
tary, “neither domestic nor international rules regulating cy-
																																																																																																																												
 90. See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20. 
 91. Hollis, supra note 21, at 392; Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 
20, art. 2–13. 
 92. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20, art. 14–35. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. Russia, a European nation that is often associated with both 
cyberattacks and cybersecurity, did not join the treaty. Hollis, supra note 21, 
at 393 n.124. 
 95. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20. Asian countries such as 
China and South Korea have been heavily involved in cybersecurity incidents 
and they have not joined the Convention on Cybersecurity. See Convention on 
Cybercrime CETS No.: 185, Treaty Office, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&
DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
 96. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20, at 169–70. 
 97. Id. (“The Present Convention is intended to . . . make criminal investi-
gations and proceedings concerning criminal offenses related to computer 
systems and data more effective and to enable the collection of evidence in 
electronic form of a criminal offence.”). 
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bercrime will apply.”98 Thus, a member state’s cyberattack up-
on another member state’s critical infrastructure will not fall 
within the scope of the Convention on Cybercrime. 
In addition, treating a cyberattack as a criminal matter does 
not effectively address national security concerns deriving from 
cyberattacks, generally. Criminal investigation requires a me-
thodical process of gathering evidence.99 This can lead to a slow 
and unsuccessful response to a cyberattack.100 Even if the Con-
vention on Cybercrime is effective at increasing the speed of 
criminal procedure, it does not guarantee that member states 
will practice stringent criminal laws to oversee their cyberat-
tack activities.101 
2. The Geneva Convention and the U.N. Charter 
Ambiguities in various provisions of current international 
treaties and agreements create confusion and doubt as to 
whether they encompass the issue of cyberattacks.102 Also, the 
legal structures of current international law do not adequately 
deal the increasing threat of cyberattacks.103 Although some 
scholars have broadly interpreted the law of war under the Ge-
neva Convention to include cyberattacks,104 others have widely 
criticized it as being inapplicable to address evolving forms of 
cyberattacks.105 The Geneva Convention is a body of law that 
deals with the law of war; however, Professor Duncan Hollis 
argues that the existing legal system under the Geneva Con-
vention suffers from 
																																																																																																																												
 98. Hollis, supra note 21, at 393. 
 99. Condron, supra note 5, at 407. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 8–9 (“When states fail to pass stringent crim-
inal laws or look the other way when attackers strike rival states, criminal 
laws are rendered impotent.”). 
 102. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 443. 
 103. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 16–17; see also Hollis, supra 
note 21, at 405–06 (arguing not only that the current law’s response to cyber-
warfare is insufficient, but it can also be dangerous; since it is not clear who 
launched the cyberattack due to the attribution problem, a mistake in re-
sponding to a wrong, innocent target can be devastating). 
 104. National Infrastructure Protection Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
at 57, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nipp.pdf; see 
also Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 16. 
 105. See id. 
2013] PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 813 
several, near-fatal conditions: uncertainty (i.e., states lack a 
clear picture of how to translate existing rules into the IO [in-
formation operations] environment); complexity (i.e., overlap-
ping legal regimes threaten to overwhelm state decision mak-
ers seeking to apply IO); and insufficiency (i.e., the existing 
rules fail to address the basic challenges of modern conflicts 
with non-state actors and facilitate IO in appropriate circum-
stances).106 
Scholars have argued that a cyberattack may constitute “use 
of force” under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and are there-
fore already prohibited. 107 However, it is not clear whether a 
cyberattack can fall within the scope of Article 2(4).108 There 
are multiple possible interpretations of this provision,109 which 
can create confusion and vagueness with regard to its precise 
meaning.110 Traditionally, the extent of the meaning of Article 
2(4) was narrowly focused on military violence.111 Although a 
cyberattack on certain infrastructure can bear some similari-
ties to physical military force, the issue of cyberattacks is a 
new one—with unique and unpredictable characteristics—that 
does not fall neatly into the category of military force.112 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether a cyberattack can consti-
tute an “armed attack” under the doctrine of self-defense pur-
suant to both Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary in-
ternational law.113 Scholars have argued that a nation can re-
spond to a cyberattack with military force based on Article 51 
																																																																																																																												
 106. Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Infor-
mation Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2007). 
 107. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see Waxman, supra note 8, at 427. 
 108. See id. at 431. 
 109. See Hollis, supra note 21, at 427–30 (offering three possible interpreta-
tions of “use of force” of the U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4): force as armed violence, 
force as coercion, and force as interference); see also Waxman, supra note 8, 
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2(4) as armed force, coercion, or interference). 
 110. See Oscar Schachter, The Rights of States to Use Armed Force, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1624 (1984) (“The paragraph is complex in its structure[,] 
and nearly all of its key terms raise questions of interpretation.”); see also 
Hollis, supra note 21, at 427. 
 111. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 431. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See Condron, supra note 5, at 413; see also Sklerov, supra note 3, at 
31–33 (providing an in-depth discussion on the subject of the self-defense 
under the U.N. Charter, Article 51 and customary international law). 
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of the U.N. Charter,114 which provides that “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nation.”115 Also, under customary inter-
national law, a victim-state and its allies have authority to use 
force in response to an armed attack.116 However, the U.N. 
Charter offers no definition of the meaning of “armed at-
tack.”117 Although certain cyberattacks that are capable of in-
flicting physical damage will challenge the bounds of the mean-
ing of “armed attack,”118 a cyberattack is often deemed to fall 
short of “armed force.”119 
Moreover, current international treaties apply only to rela-
tions among different nation states, and not individual non-
state actors.120 This is an important issue because the ability of 
a nation to appropriately retaliate within an international legal 
regime depends on what type of entity initiated the attack.121 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States and other countries have interpreted customary interna-
tional law to allow “states to now treat the law of self-defense 
as applicable to acts by non-state actors.”122 Nevertheless, it is 
uncertain whether these international treaties can govern in-
dividual attackers who act independently of any government.123 
																																																																																																																												
 114. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 427. 
 115. U.N. Charter art. 51. This provision serves as an exception to the gen-
eral prohibition of use of force laid out in the U.N. Charter, Article 2(4). 
 116. See Michael Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 529 (2003) (describing how a response under the self-
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B. The Difficulty of Establishing an Effective Future Interna-
tional Agreement on Cyberattacks 
In order to address flaws and uncertainties regarding the 
current international agreements, scholars and politicians have 
called for a more effective international cyber-warfare treaty.124 
However, it is unlikely that the international community will 
establish such a treaty anytime soon.125 Unless there is a com-
plete overhaul of the current structure of the Internet and cy-
berspace, the attribution problem will always exist.126 If a gov-
ernment cannot trace and prosecute the attacker, then any 
such treaty will have no enforcement power.127 
Moreover, Russia and the United States, two nations heavily 
involved in the growing area of cyberattacks, are currently in 
disagreement over an international treaty.128 In 1998, the Rus-
sian government proposed that U.N. member states form a 
treaty to ban cyberweapons.129 Russia, concerned with increas-
ing danger of military activities on civilian networks, argued 
for its proposed treaty by comparing it to existing treaties regu-
lating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.130 However, 
the United States disagreed and argued that it is “impossible to 
																																																																																																																												
 124. See id. at 19–20. 
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 126. Hollis, supra note 21, at 398–99; Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 22. 
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supra note 125 (“With the United States and European democracies at one 
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 129. See U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., 1st Comm., Letter dated 23 September 
1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/53/3 (Sept. 30. 1998); see 
also Hollis, supra note 21, at 406–07. 
 130. See John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, In Shift, U.S. Talks to Russia 
on Internet Security, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/science/13cyber.html?scp=1&sq=u.s.%20t
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draw a line between the commercial and military uses of hard-
ware and software.”131 Instead, the United States called for in-
creased cooperation among nations in opposing cybercrime and 
stronger cybersecurity measures within each nation’s net-
work.132 
The United States’ position is understandable. The total ban-
ning of cyberattacks, made up entirely of computer codes, pre-
sents a difficulty in enforcement that is entirely different than 
that of nuclear or chemical weapons.133 Unlike nuclear or chem-
ical weapons, hacking skills and hacking codes are available to 
the general population throughout the world, and many enti-
ties can develop and obtain them without as much expense or 
difficulty as a nuclear weapon would require.134 Also, any in-
ternational treaty banning cyberweapons will limit the United 
States’ position in cyberspace.135 The United States is continu-
ously and consistently the target of a countless number of 
cyberattacks, and the functionality of the country heavily de-
pends on sophisticated and well-connected computer net-
works.136 Furthermore, about 80 percent of the global Internet 
traffic passes through the United States. 137  Yet despite the 
United States’ constant threat of suffering cyberattacks, the 
nation still holds the premier position in cyberspace. Thus, the 
United States is not likely to limit its available responses to a 
cyberattack by agreeing to a total-ban treaty of any potential 
cyberweapons.138 
IV. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT GRANTING AUTOMATIC LEGAL 
AUTHORITY TO RESPOND WITH MILITARY ACTION 
To effectively protect nations from a cyberattack, there must 
be an international agreement (“Proposed Agreement” or 
“Agreement”) that grants a member state the legal authority to 
respond with a military action to a cyberattack to its critical 
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infrastructure. The military response under the Proposed 
Agreement will adhere to the customary international law 
principles of necessity and proportionality. Since the threat of 
cyberattack on a country’s critical infrastructure is real and 
imminent, the international committee should view such an 
attack as a threat to national security. Also, the Proposed 
Agreement will minimize the attribution problem of cyberat-
tacks to critical infrastructure by compelling member states to 
exercise rigorous criminal law enforcement of cyberattacks. 
The Proposed Agreement will create a strong incentive for na-
tions, especially those that depend heavily on computer net-
works to operate their critical infrastructure, to join the 
Agreement because it will prevent cyberattacks on their critical 
infrastructure. 
As for selecting or creating a body to pass the Proposed 
Agreement, it makes sense that the U.N. should be in charge of 
the task. The Proposed Agreement’s goal is to prevent a sophis-
ticated cyberattack from seriously harming a country’s critical 
infrastructure, which certainly falls within the scope of the 
U.N.’s mission to “maintain[] international peace and securi-
ty.”139 Additionally, the U.N. has 193 member states,140 and has 
vast experience in passing international treaties and agree-
ments.141 Therefore, the U.N. is an ideal body to effectively pass 
and implement the Proposed Agreement. 
A. Components of the Proposed Agreement 
The Proposed Agreement should contain the following com-
ponents: (1) a clear definition of what constitutes a nation 
state’s critical infrastructure;142 (2) a requirement that each 
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member state maintain a public list of existing critical infra-
structure and give notice that such infrastructure is covered 
and protected under the Agreement;143 (3) a confirmed attribu-
tion of a cyberattack that identifies the origin of the attack on 
protected critical infrastructure of a member state; (4) auto-
matic legal authority to respond with a military action against 
the imputed member state from which the attack originated 
absent further attribution;144 and (5) a requirement that the 
military response to the cyberattack meets the necessity and 
proportionality requirement under the self-defense principle 
pursuant to customary international law.145 
Scholars argue that when the subject of a cyberattack is a na-
tion’s critical infrastructure, the targeted nation should possess 
a protected right to initiate a good-faith response to the at-
tack.146 Still, the Proposed Agreement’s requirement of follow-
ing the principles of existing customary international law will 
prevent possible overreaction to a cyberattack. 147 Necessity ex-
ists when “self-defense is actually required under the circum-
stances because a reasonable settlement could not be attained 
through peaceful means.” 148  Proportionality requires “self-
defense action to be limited to the amount of force necessary to 
defeat an ongoing attack or to deter future aggression.”149 
Imposing such a necessity requirement will restrain military 
response such that it remains the option of last resort. Alt-
hough the Proposed Agreement may not specifically mention 
which type of cyberattack on critical infrastructure triggers a 
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military response, the necessity requirement will limit the vic-
tim-member state to military action only when the damage to 
critical infrastructure is substantial. Article 41 of the U.N. 
Charter states that a “complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations and of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communications” is not a measure constituting 
armed attack150  and a cyberattack on critical infrastructure 
does not necessarily result in loss of lives or massive property 
damage 151  Thus, responding with military action when a 
cyberattack does not result in substantial property damage or 
loss of lives would be unreasonable under the context of the at-
tack,152 and would violate the necessity principle. 
If a cyberattack on a victim-member state’s critical infra-
structure results in loss of lives or massive property damage, 
then the military response must be proportional to the damage 
inflicted by the cyberattack. Since a nation’s survival can very 
well depend on the wellness of its critical infrastructure, the 
nation may have to resort to “an immediate, robust, and ag-
gressive response.” 153  In addition, under the proportionality 
principle, the victim-member state can respond with force that 
will have a deterrent effect,154 and responding with military 
action to a cyberattack resembling an armed attack would be 
proportional.155 However, it would extend beyond the scope of 
the proportionality requirement for the victim-nation to engage 
in a full-on invasion when, for example, it suffered the destruc-
tion of a nuclear plant or a power outage that resulted in a 
train crash.156 
																																																																																																																												
 150. U.N. Charter art. 41. 
 151. See Susan Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to Cy-
bercrime/Terrorism/Warfare”, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 391–97 
(2007) (noting that a cyberattack can result in “mass interference” or “mass 
disruption” of a country’s communications or other infrastructure). 
 152. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 32. 
 153. See Condron, supra note 5, at 415. 
 154. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 32–33. 
 155. See Shackelford, supra note 21, at 236–39. 
 156. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 33. 
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B. Remediating Failures of Existing Treaties 
1. Cyberattack on National Critical Infrastructure as a Nation-
al Security Matter 
A successful cyberattack on a nation’s critical infrastructure 
can have a devastating effect,157 and such an attack should be a 
matter of national security rather than treated merely as a 
criminal act. As evident in the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian 
uranium enrichment plant, certain cyberattacks on national 
critical infrastructure can inflict damage equivalent to physical 
damage.158 Despite the gravity of such an attack, the United 
States and other countries have always treated cyberattacks as 
a criminal activity and not a national security matter.159 The 
problem with treating a cyberattack as a criminal matter, es-
pecially when it targets a nation’s critical infrastructure, is 
that doing so can result in a delayed response because investi-
gation of a criminal act often requires a process of evidence 
gathering, which could take potentially up to several months.160 
Such delayed responses may result in lives lost, massive prop-
erty damage,161 or both. 
																																																																																																																												
 157. See Condron, supra note 5, at 407 (“Critical infrastructure is by defini-
tion essential for the survival of the nation.”); see also supra Part II. 
 158. See Brenner, supra note 151, at 390–91 (describing such a cyberattack 
as a “weapon of mass destruction”). 
 159. See Condron, supra note 5, at 407; see also Convention on Cybercrime, 
supra note 20, pmbl. (The Convention treats cybercrime as a criminal mat-
ter.). The White House’s Cybersecurity Proposal also seems to classify 
cyberattacks as criminal matter. Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 17. See 
Schmitd, supra note 18 (“The Administration proposal advances the security 
of our increasingly “wired” critical infrastructure, strengthens the criminal 
penalties for hacking into the systems that control these vital resources, and 
clarifies the ability of companies and the government to voluntarily share 
information about cybersecurity threats and incidents in a privacy-protective 
manner.”). 
 160. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Computer National Infra-
structure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 207, 232 (2002); see also Condron, supra note 5, at 407 (“Because law en-
forcement investigations that require the methodical collection of evidence 
are often protracted and resource-intensive, typically taking days, weeks, or 
even months, this presumption may result in a very slow response that may 
come too late to confront a cyber attack successfully.”). 
 161. Condron, supra note 5, at 407. 
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However, due to the increasing danger of cyberattacks,162 the 
U.S. government has already taken a position that a cyberat-
tack can constitute an act of war, triggering a military response 
from the United States.163 Colonel David Lapan, the Director of 
the Press Office at the Department of Defense, stated that “if 
we are attacked we reserve the right to do any number of 
things in response just like we do now with kinetic attack . . . . 
So it makes the idea that attacks in cyber would be viewed in a 
way that attacks in a kinetic form are now, the military option 
is always a resort.”164 The U.S. government’s position on this 
point reflects its view, framed within debate on the interpreta-
tion of “armed attack” under the U.N. Charter and customary 
international law,165 that a cyberattack can elevate to the sta-
tus of an armed attack.166 
Any country that relies heavily on networked computer sys-
tems to control the country’s critical infrastructure must act 
																																																																																																																												
 162. See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, 
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tional Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Net-
worked World, WHITE HOUSE 14 (May 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strate
gy_for_cyberspace.pdf [hereinafter International Strategy for Cyberspace]. 
 164. Shaughnessy, supra note 163. 
 165. See supra Part III.3 
 166. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 57 (citing Michael Schmitt, Computer 
Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 913-15 (1999)) (Lieu-
tenant Commander Sklerov cites and discusses Schmitt’s explanation of six 
criteria for evaluating cyberattacks as armed attack: severity, immediacy, 
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immediately to protect itself in the face of the continuous and 
ongoing danger of cyberattack, considering the ever-present 
danger of one on a nation’s critical infrastructure. As noted 
above, the threat of Stuxnet virus is far from being over, and 
viruses that have the equal or more advanced capacity than 
Stuxnet have emerged in cyberspace.167 For example, federal 
officials of the U.S. government are investigating a possible 
cyberattack that occurred in November 2011 that caused a 
shutdown of a public water pump in Illinois.168 A dangerous 
cyberattack such as Stuxnet, or any redesigned form of Stux-
net, can strike anytime on any country’s critical infrastructure 
network. 
Unlike the Convention on Cybercrime, 169  the Proposed 
Agreement will treat a cyberattack on a nation’s critical infra-
structure as a national security matter, and not a criminal 
act.170 Doing so can overcome the faults of treating it as a crim-
inal matter, including, specifically, the potential for a delayed 
response by allowing for a response “nearly simultaneous with 
the attack itself.”171 The Proposed Agreement should accelerate 
the responding time to a cyberattack because it will not require 
a process of evidence gathering, and its attribution require-
ment is only to the level of a member state, not a machine or an 
individual attacker. Thus, the Proposed Agreement gives a 
member state authority to instantly take action once its critical 
infrastructure becomes the target of a cyberattack. 
2. Criminal Law Enforcement and the Attribution Problem 
Due to the attribution problem, a country planning to re-
spond with military action will have difficulty trying to pin-
point the origin of a cyberattack; tracking down the country, 
																																																																																																																												
 167. See supra Part II. 
 168. Mike M. Ahlers, Feds Investigating Illinois ‘Pump Failure’ as Possible 
Cyber Attack, CNN (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/18/us/cyber-
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entity, or machine responsible. 172  However, the Proposed 
Agreement will not require the responding country to track 
down the source of the attack to the exact machine or person of 
origin. The Agreement has a narrow scope and it only applies 
to cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, meaning that the 
cyberattack must be capable of infiltrating complex systems 
and defensive mechanisms. Such sophisticated cyberattacks 
most likely require advanced technology and government re-
sources not readily available to a single individual or non-
government affiliated group,173 which, for example, accounts for 
the widespread attribution of the Stuxnet virus to the U.S. and 
Israeli governments.174 Other examples abound: experts believe 
that the Russian government was behind the cyberattack on 
Estonia, and that either China or North Korea was behind the 
cyberattack that targeted government websites in South Korea 
and the United States.175 Thus, since cyberattacks in issue un-
der the Proposed Agreement are likely to be launched by a gov-
ernment, the Agreement will require the responding state to 
only find out which country launched the attack, not which 
specific machine or person did so. 
Nonetheless, the Proposed Agreement can seek to further 
mitigate the attribution problem and any related misattribu-
tion by incentivizing each member state to prevent and regu-
late cyberattack activity within its borders. Although this Note 
is skeptical of the efficacy of treating a cyberattack on critical 
infrastructure as a criminal act, that skepticism is confined to 
the problem of possible delayed police response. Properly en-
acted, the Proposed Agreement can incentivize member states 
to prevent cyberattacks domestically by engaging in heavy pre-
ventative measures and strict local law enforcement. On the 
one hand, rigorous and stringent criminal laws and law en-
forcement can have a deterring effect on cyberattack.176 On the 
other hand, certainly, when “states fail to pass stringent crimi-
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 174. See Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 50. 
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nal laws or look the other way when attackers strike rival 
states, criminal laws are rendered impotent.”177 However, the 
Proposed Agreement can force member states to increase their 
effort to prevent and catch those who engage in cyberattacks 
because a cyberattack originating within its borders can trigger 
a military response from other member states. Each member 
state will thus be more cautious and thorough in their effort to 
regulate cyberattacks. 
3. Why Join the Proposed Agreement? 
The Proposed Agreement provides strong incentives for coun-
tries to join. It addresses increasingly dangerous threats of so-
phisticated cyberattacks on national critical infrastructure, 
which have the potential to cause loss of life and property dam-
age.178 It provides an instant and efficient legal route to ad-
dress a national security threat by granting an authorization to 
respond with military action to a cyberattack.179 Moreover, the 
Agreement minimizes the attribution problem by incentivizing 
each member state to practice more rigorous law enforcement, 
potentially resulting in an even greater degree of cyberattack 
prevention.180 
Of course there will still be shortcomings to the Agreement. 
One major concern is that signing onto the Agreement will sub-
ject a member state to be the target of military force when a 
cyberattack is determined to come from within its borders. This 
will not likely be an appealing aspect of the Proposed Agree-
ment and may possibly deter countries from joining it. Yet, 
there are several reasons why this concern should not play a 
large role in a nation’s decision to join the Agreement. First, 
under the necessity and proportionality requirement pursuant 
to component (5) of the Proposed Agreement, the threshold to 
trigger military response is very high.181 Recall that under this 
requirement, a cyberattack that does not cause loss of life or 
massive property damage would not initiate a kinetic military 
																																																																																																																												
 177. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 9. “Unfortunately, several major states[, such 
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2013] PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 825 
reaction.182 Second, engaging in military action is not cheap,183 
and countries are not likely to resort to military action unless 
deemed necessary.184 
Third, developed countries with significant military power 
will have a greater incentive to join the Agreement because a 
country that is more developed is likely to suffer more devas-
tating impacts from a sophisticated cyberattack.185 Some states 
are more dependent on computer networks, and a cyberattack 
to such states’ critical infrastructure, compared to attacks on 
less developed countries’ infrastructure, can have a larger and 
more disastrous impact.186 Thus, member states will be more 
reluctant to launch a cyberattack against, and risk military re-
sponse from, more developed countries. 
Yet, at the same time, this does not mean that smaller, less 
developed countries are at a disadvantage by signing onto the 
Agreement.187  Critical infrastructure of less developed coun-
tries is not likely to be the target of a sophisticated cyberattack. 
Since their infrastructure system does not rely heavily on cyber 
networks to function, the impact of a cyberattack on their criti-
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cal infrastructure is less likely to have a devastating effect.188 
For example, a cyberattack on North Korea would not have 
much effect on its critical infrastructure because its networked 
system is very outdated compared to other developed countries 
such as the United States or South Korea.189 Also, these less 
developed countries are not likely to have resources or funding 
to develop a cyberattack that is advanced and sophisticated 
enough to effectively infiltrate other countries’ cyber defense 
system and cause massive damage to their infrastructure.190 As 
a result, it is not probable that their actions in cyberspace will 
trigger military response under the Proposed Agreement and, 
thus, they stand to gain more than they risk by signing on. 
CONCLUSION 
As technology advances, countries will only increase their de-
pendence on cyber networks to operate their national infra-
structure. The national critical infrastructure will continue to 
be essential to governmental functions and to how people com-
municate, travel, obtain their necessities, and maintain their 
safety and health. Thus, a successful cyberattack on national 
critical infrastructure can cause an immense amount of dam-
age, a threat that grows ever more dangerous due to increasing 
sophistication of cyberattacks. Therefore, it is critical that the 
international community respond promptly to meet the chal-
lenge of preventing such threats. 
The Proposed Agreement provides an automatic authoriza-
tion for injured member states to engage in military action in 
response to a cyberattack on their critical infrastructure. The 
Agreement remedies the flaws of the existing international 
treaty framework and international law by treating cyberat-
tacks as a national security matter, by offering an immediate 
response to the danger of such an attack, and by minimizing 
the attribution problem. Furthermore, the Agreement’s narrow 
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scope will only govern cyberattacks on critical infrastructure 
that will cause loss of lives or massive property damage while 
its necessity and proportionality requirements will prevent 
overreaction to a cyberattack. The Proposed Agreement will 
offer incentives for countries to join so they can prevent 
cyberattacks from causing disastrous damage to their govern-
ment infrastructure and to their citizens. 
We have a tendency to wait too long—until it is too late. 
Technology advances and changes at an exponentially rapid 
speed. And with that, greater risks are posed to national criti-
cal infrastructure from dangerous cyberattacks. Countries 
around the world should act now and not wait until massive, 
key infrastructures are destroyed or, worse, lives are lost. 
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